Key Takeaways
- On March 5, 2026, India invoked the Essential Commodities Act — emergency powers last used post-Ukraine — ordering all refineries to halt petrochemical production and divert every molecule of propane and butane to household LPG. The trigger: 85–90% of India’s LPG imports come through the Strait of Hormuz, now blockaded.
- India consumed 31.3 million tonnes of LPG in 2024-25 but produced only 12.8 million tonnes domestically. Import dependency has grown from 47% in 2015 to over 65% in 2024 — moving backwards even as India’s biofuel programme accelerated.
- CBG (Compressed Biogas) is chemically identical to CNG. It can run the same buses, serve the same city gas networks, and heat the same industrial boilers — with zero geopolitical risk, because its feedstock grows in Indian fields.
- India has approximately 130 operational CBG plants as of late 2025, against a SATAT target of 5,000. India’s total CBG potential from all feedstocks is 87 billion cubic metres per year. Current output is less than 1% of that potential.
- Bio-LPG — renewable propane chemically identical to fossil LPG — can go into the same steel cylinder, use the same stove, and serve the same 10 crore PMUY household that currently depends on Hormuz-routed imports. No new infrastructure required.
India Declared a Cooking Gas Emergency Last Week. The Root Cause Has Been Decades in the Making.
On the evening of March 5, 2026, the Ministry of Petroleum and Natural Gas issued an extraordinary order. Every oil refinery in India — public sector and private, Reliance Jamnagar to HPCL Vizag — was directed to stop making petrochemicals and redirect all propane and butane streams to LPG production. No exceptions. The government had invoked the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 — the same emergency powers used after Russia invaded Ukraine — to protect the cooking fuel supply of 33 crore Indian households [1].
Within 48 hours, the consequences became visible in every city. In Mumbai, the Hotel Owners Association AHAR reported that 20% of hotels and restaurants had shut temporarily because commercial LPG cylinders had simply stopped arriving [2]. In Chennai, the local hotel association shared a video of distributors openly stating they had no stock [2]. In Bengaluru and Hyderabad, hospitality operators said their supplies had fallen 40-50%. In the ceramic manufacturing hub of Morbi, Gujarat — the world’s second-largest — production had effectively halved as gas quotas dropped and penalty rates doubled for any excess consumption [3]. In Kolkata, domestic cylinders were trading on the black market at ₹1,500. In Delhi, they hit ₹3,000 [4].
The official explanation was the Strait of Hormuz. Iran, in retaliation for US-Israeli strikes on its nuclear sites, had closed the strait. 85 to 90% of India’s LPG imports transit that 33-kilometre passage. India’s strategic LPG reserve — stored in caverns at Mangalore and Vizag — held roughly 10 days of supply [4]. The government scrambled to sign a 2.2 million tonne emergency contract with US Gulf Coast suppliers, at higher cost, via longer routes that bypass Hormuz [5]. That contract covers approximately 10% of India’s annual import needs. The other 90% was a problem with no quick fix.
But here is what was missing from every emergency order, every cabinet briefing, every prime ministerial statement in that week: any mention of domestic alternatives. No mention of CBG. No mention of Bio-LPG. No mention of the 130 operational compressed biogas plants already selling gas to city gas distribution networks across India. No acknowledgement that India has the feedstock, the technology, and the policy framework to produce a domestic gas substitute at scale — and has simply not built enough of it.
This blog is about what those alternatives are, how they work, why their commercial case is now unarguable, and what it will take to build the infrastructure India should have been building for the last decade.
60% of India's Cooking Gas Comes Through a Strait That Can Be Closed in Hours. Here Are the Numbers.
India is the world’s second-largest importer of LPG. The scale of the dependency is worth stating precisely, because it is more extreme than most people realise.
India consumed 31.3 million tonnes of LPG in 2024-25. Domestic production was 12.8 million tonnes — 41% of demand. The remaining 59-65% came from imports, of which more than 85% passed through the Strait of Hormuz from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait [1, 5]. India imported 23.3 million tonnes of LPG in 2025, up 8.4% from 2024 — the trajectory is going in precisely the wrong direction [6].
What makes this particularly troubling is the trend line. India’s LPG import dependency was 47% in 2015. By 2024, it had reached over 65% — and is projected by the IEA to reach 37.7 million tonnes of demand by 2030 at current growth rates [7]. In the same decade that India’s ethanol blending programme took petrol blending from 2% to nearly 20%, India’s gas import exposure deepened significantly. The structural work was done for liquid fuel. For gaseous cooking fuel, it was largely not done.
The natural gas picture compounds the problem. India imports approximately 50% of its natural gas needs as LNG, valued at $13.3 billion in FY2023-24 [8]. Natural gas currently accounts for 6.5% of India’s energy mix. The government’s target is 15% by 2030 [9]. Without a large-scale domestic CBG programme, hitting that target means more LNG imports, not fewer — more Hormuz exposure, not less.
The IEA’s 2025 India Gas Market Report estimates India’s CBG potential at approximately 87 billion cubic metres per year from available feedstocks [10]. Current output from India’s 130-odd CBG plants: less than 1% of that potential. That gap — between the domestic gas India could be producing and the imported gas it is currently buying — is the structural problem that this week’s emergency order has made impossible to ignore.
Key Fact | Source |
India LPG consumed FY2024-25: 31.3 MMT | Sunday Guardian Live / AngelOne, March 2026 [1] |
Domestic LPG production: 12.8 MMT (41% of demand) | Sunday Guardian Live / AngelOne, March 2026 [1] |
LPG import dependency: 47% (2015) → 65%+ (2024) | Drewry Maritime Research, 2025 [6] |
LPG imports 2025: 23.3 MMT — up 8.4% from 2024 | Business Standard / Kpler, March 2026 [7] |
India LNG imports FY2023-24: 66.7 billion m³ ($13.3 bn) | Global Methane Initiative / TERI, Jan 2025 [8] |
India CBG potential: ~87 billion m³/year (all feedstocks) | IEA India Gas Market Report, 2025 [10] |
Current CBG output: <1% of potential | IEA India Gas Market Report, 2025 [10] |
India strategic LPG reserve: ~10 days only | National Herald India, March 2026 [4] |
🔴 LIVE CRISIS CONTEXT (March 2026):
- March 5: ESMA invoked — all refineries ordered to divert propane/butane to LPG.
- March 7: Delhi domestic cylinder hits ₹913 (+₹60 overnight). Commercial +₹302.50 in 2026.
- Mumbai: 20% hotels shut (AHAR). Chennai: distributors report zero stock.
- Morbi ceramics: production halved. Kolkata black market: ₹1,500/cylinder.
- Strategic reserve: ~10 days. US emergency contract: 2.2 MMT (10% of import needs).
Sources: Sunday Guardian Live, The Week, National Herald, India TV News — March 2026.
CBG Is Chemically Identical to CNG. It Runs the Same Buses, Feeds the Same Networks, Heats the Same Factories — With Zero Geopolitical Risk.
Compressed Biogas is produced through anaerobic digestion — the breakdown of organic matter by microorganisms in the absence of oxygen. Cattle dung, paddy straw, press mud, municipal solid waste, food processing effluent: any organic material with carbon content can feed a biogas digester. The raw gas produced — roughly 55-65% methane and 35-45% CO₂ — is purified to over 90% methane purity and compressed to 200 bar, producing a gas that is chemically identical to fossil CNG in energy content and combustion characteristics [9].
This chemical identity is CBG’s most commercially important property. It means that a city bus currently running on fossil CNG can run on CBG without any modification. A household PNG connection served by a City Gas Distribution network can receive CBG blended into the supply without any change to appliances or pipework. An industrial boiler burning fossil gas can switch to CBG without capital expenditure on new equipment. The transition from fossil gas to CBG is invisible at the point of consumption — it only happens at the production and distribution stage.
This is the critical contrast with any other alternative fuel. Electric vehicles require new engines, new charging infrastructure, new consumer behaviour. Green hydrogen requires new storage, new pipelines, new fuel cells. CBG requires none of these things. The infrastructure — 8,400 CNG stations, 307 CGD geographical areas, 1.57 crore PNG connections, 25,429 km of gas pipelines — already exists and is already compatible [11].
What SATAT Has Built — and How Far It Still Has to Go
India launched the SATAT (Sustainable Alternative Towards Affordable Transportation) initiative in October 2018, offering OMC offtake agreements to CBG producers at government-administered prices. The scheme aimed for 5,000 plants producing 15 MMT annually by 2025. The actual number as of late 2025: over 130 commissioned plants, with 1,094 active Letters of Intent and a further 690 projects registered but yet to begin construction [11, 12].
The gap between 130 and 5,000 is large. But the trajectory is encouraging. The sector grew from just 3 plants in 2019-20 to 130 by late 2025. CBG sales in FY2024-25 reached 42,800 tonnes — more than half of all CBG ever sold in India since 2019 combined [12]. The Mandatory CBG Blending Obligation (CBO) — requiring City Gas Distribution companies to blend 1% CBG from FY2025-26, rising to 5% by FY2028-29 — has created for the first time a hard, legally mandated demand floor for CBG [12]. HPCL has committed USD 231 million to develop 24 CBG plants using mixed feedstocks [13]. Prayagraj’s Arail municipal waste plant, inaugurated in November 2025, is converting 100 tonnes of wet waste daily into CBG [13].
The pricing has also improved. From May 2025, OMC procurement prices for CBG were revised to 85% of the prevailing CNG retail selling price (₹74-81/kg), up from 80% — improving plant economics across the sector [12]. CBG is now available across 64 geographical areas through the CGD network and at 350 retail outlets — still small relative to the CNG network, but growing [12].
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The CBG vs Fossil Fuel Comparison — Side by Side
| Factor | CBG (Compressed Biogas) | Fossil LPG | Fossil CNG/PNG |
| Source | Domestic biomass — fully indigenous | Imported: 65%+ via Hormuz | Imported: ~50% as LNG |
| Geopolitical risk | None — feedstock grows in India | CRITICAL — March 2026 ESMA | Moderate — LNG imports |
| Infrastructure fit | 100% compatible — same CNG stations | Separate cylinder supply chain | Direct pipeline/CGD fit |
| Offtake certainty | OMC PPA 10-15 yr; CBO mandate FY2025+ | Market price; subsidy variable | PNGRB-regulated tariff |
| CO₂ reduction | Up to 80% vs fossil CNG | High-carbon fossil fuel | Lower than LPG, still fossil |
| By-product | FOM biofertiliser — ₹1,500/MT MDA support | None | None |
| Reserve risk | Zero — plant produces fresh daily | 10-day strategic reserve only | Storage dependent on imports |
Bio-LPG: The Renewable Cooking Gas That Goes Into the Same Cylinder Already in Your Kitchen
CBG solves the CNG and piped gas problem. But for the 33 crore Indians who cook with LPG cylinders — and especially the 10 crore poorest households who received connections under Pradhan Mantri Ujjwala Yojana — Bio-LPG is the relevant technology. And it is simpler, in a fundamental way, than CBG.
Bio-LPG — also called renewable propane or bio-propane — is a gas produced from biological feedstocks that is chemically identical to the propane and butane mixture in conventional LPG. It can be liquefied under the same conditions as fossil LPG, stored in the same cylinders, transported in the same trucks, and burned on the same stoves — requiring zero modification to existing infrastructure. The combustion products are indistinguishable. The consumer experience is identical.
For 10 crore PMUY households in semi-urban and rural India — households that have no access to piped gas and no immediate prospect of CGD network coverage — bio-LPG is the only renewable path to clean cooking fuel. CBG requires proximity to a CNG station or gas pipeline. Bio-LPG requires nothing except the same steel cylinder that is already in the kitchen.
How Bio-LPG Is Produced — The Three Pathways
There are three primary routes to bio-LPG production, and India already has the feedstocks and early infrastructure for all three:
- As a by-product of biodiesel production: When vegetable oils or UCO are converted to biodiesel (FAME) through transesterification, an off-gas stream containing propane and butane is produced. At standard yields, approximately 50 kg of bio-LPG can be recovered per tonne of biodiesel output. India’s growing UCO biodiesel sector — already supplying OMCs at ₹100.12/litre under SATAT equivalent schemes — is already producing this off-gas stream at most plants. The question is whether operators are capturing and selling it, or venting it as waste.
- CBG liquefaction: Purified biogas (>98% methane) can be further compressed and cooled to produce liquefied biogas, or further processed to separate and liquefy the propane and butane fractions as bio-LPG. This adds capital cost to a CBG plant but creates a higher-value product suited for the cylinder distribution network.
- Gasification followed by Fischer-Tropsch synthesis: Biomass is converted to syngas through high-temperature gasification, and syngas is catalytically converted to a range of liquid and gaseous hydrocarbons including bio-LPG. This is a more capital-intensive route, better suited to large-scale operations near dense biomass supply zones.
The global bio-LPG market was valued at USD 2.15 billion in 2025 and is growing at 15.4% annually, projected to reach USD 4.4 billion by 2030 [14]. India and Indonesia have been specifically identified by the Propane Council and international energy agencies as the highest-priority markets for bio-LPG deployment — precisely because of their massive household LPG consumption and their high import exposure. Europe is already mandating bio-LPG blending in heating fuel. India has no equivalent programme yet.
The bio-LPG policy gap in India is real: there is no SATAT-equivalent for bio-LPG, no administered offtake price, no blending obligation for LPG cylinders. This is the single biggest structural barrier to investment in Indian bio-LPG production. And it is also, for the right investor and technology developer, a first-mover opportunity of significant scale — the market is wide open precisely because the policy framework has not yet arrived.
CBG solves India’s gas crisis for transport and industry. Bio-LPG solves it for the kitchen. Between the two, India has a domestically producible, infrastructure-compatible answer to both the CNG and the LPG import problem. The feedstock is Indian agricultural waste. The technology is proven. The policy for CBG is already in place. Bio-LPG policy is the next frontier. |
The Commercial Case for CBG Investment Has Never Been Stronger — and This Week's Crisis Just Made It Undeniable
Energy security arguments are viscerally compelling in a crisis week. But the commercial case for CBG plants has to stand on its own after the crisis fades. It does — and it is stronger today than it has been at any point in SATAT’s history.
Revenue Stack for a CBG Plant
- Primary revenue — CBG sales: ₹74-81/kg under OMC purchase agreements (revised May 2025 to 85% of CNG RSP). For a 5 TPD plant, approximately ₹1.93 crore annually from CBG sales. 10-15 year offtake guarantee from IndianOil, HPCL, or BPCL. No market risk for the output [12].
- Secondary revenue — FOM sales: Fermented Organic Manure produced at roughly 60 kg per tonne of biogas feedstock. ₹1,500 per tonne Market Development Assistance from the government. For a cattle dung-based plant, FOM can add ₹25-40 lakh per year in revenue [15].
- Tertiary revenue — CO₂ monetisation: For every tonne of CBG produced, 0.5 tonnes of CO₂ is generated in purification. Most operators currently vent this. Food-grade CO₂ (beverage industry, food preservation) trades at ₹4,000-8,000 per tonne. Plants with CO₂ capture and compression equipment can add a meaningful third revenue stream [9].
- Carbon credits: CBG projects generating Verified Emission Reductions can access voluntary carbon markets. India’s Carbon Credit Trading Scheme (CCTS) is operational and growing. CBG projects displacing fossil CNG qualify for carbon credits that add ₹500-2,000 per tonne CO₂ equivalent, depending on certification pathway.
The Policy Stack — Support Available Right Now
- SATAT / OMC offtake: Purchase agreements at administered prices with mandatory CBO demand floor from FY2025-26, scaling to 5% by FY2028-29. Demand certainty unmatched in any other renewable energy sector.
- MNRE Central Financial Assistance: Up to ₹4 crore per 4,800 kg/day CBG capacity, maximum ₹10 crore per project — direct capex reduction.
- DPI Scheme (Pipeline Infrastructure): ₹994.50 crore allocated for FY2024-26 to fund CBG-CGD pipeline connectivity for 100 projects — removing the last-mile distribution cost.
- BAM Scheme (Biomass Aggregation Machinery): ₹564.75 crore for FY2023-27 for feedstock collection equipment — addressing the supply chain cost that is the most common reason for plant underperformance.
- RBI Priority Sector Lending: Loans up to ₹50 crore for CBG projects classified as PSL — lower interest rates and easier bank access for first-time investors.
- GOBARdhan Scheme: ₹10,000 crore pipeline investment; 500 GOBARdhan plants targeted nationally — rural CBG infrastructure specifically supported.
Who This Opportunity Is For
Sugar mills with excess press mud and bagasse. Dairy cooperatives sitting on large volumes of cattle dung. Municipalities handling 500+ tonnes per day of municipal solid waste with no viable disposal pathway. Logistics companies wanting to hedge against commercial LPG and CNG price volatility. Industrial gas users in Morbi, Surat, Ludhiana — exactly the businesses that halted production this week because their gas quota was cut.
For all of these, CBG is not primarily an environmental investment. It is an energy security investment. The Morbi ceramics cluster that saw production halve in March 2026 because of Hormuz could have been operating a captive CBG plant on organic waste from its own manufacturing process. It wasn’t. The cost of that absence was a week of production losses. The long-term cost is repeated every time Hormuz is threatened.
Why Only 130 Plants Exist Against a 5,000 Target — An Honest Assessment
CBG’s commercial case is strong, the policy support is real, and the demand is guaranteed. So why does a gap of 4,870 plants exist between the SATAT target and reality? The honest answer has several parts.
The most significant operational failure mode is feedstock supply chain weakness, not technology failure. A 2025 study by the US EPA, TERI, and the Global Methane Initiative that examined 11 CBG plants across five states in northern India found that 4 of the 11 had ceased operations — and in every case, the primary cause was feedstock supply management, not plant malfunction [8]. The anaerobic digester worked. The PSA purification system worked. The gas simply stopped arriving because the aggregation infrastructure — balers, covered storage, reliable transport contracts — had not been built to the same standard as the plant itself.
The second challenge is pricing structure. At 85% of CNG retail selling price, CBG makes commercial sense under optimal feedstock conditions. But developers argue this undervalues a fuel that eliminates methane emissions and manages waste — and that industrial buyers benchmark CBG against PNG rather than against its environmental value. Without a carbon premium or a green gas obligation for industrial users, CBG competes only on price rather than on its full value [12].
The third is FOM market development. Every CBG plant produces large volumes of Fermented Organic Manure. Most plants are not selling it efficiently because organised bulk buyers are absent in most districts, and FOM lacks sufficient nitrogen and potassium content to displace chemical fertilisers without blending [9]. The ₹1,500/MT government MDA helps at the margin, but the FOM market needs the same organised off-take infrastructure as the CBG market.
None of these are insurmountable. They are the operational realities that distinguish experienced plant operators from first-time investors — and the reason that choosing an EPC partner with deep operational experience in feedstock supply chain development, multi-clearance navigation, and FOM marketing is as important as choosing the right digester technology.
India Cannot Afford to Wait for the Next Hormuz Closure to Start Building Domestic Gas Infrastructure
The LPG crisis of March 2026 is not a surprise. Every energy analyst who watched India’s LPG import dependency grow from 47% in 2015 to 65% in 2024 while the biofuel programme focused almost exclusively on liquid fuel for petrol blending saw this coming. The Strait of Hormuz has been a vulnerability, not a theoretical risk, since India became the world’s second-largest LPG importer.
What the crisis has done is compress the political timeline. Invoking the Essential Commodities Act, rationing households to one cylinder per 25 days, watching 8,000 Mumbai hotels shut and Morbi ceramics production halve — these are not abstract macroeconomic statistics. They are political facts with electoral consequences. The government that did not build domestic gas alternatives now faces a gas emergency. The government that builds them will not.
CBG and Bio-LPG are not future technologies. They are operating today — in Prayagraj’s municipal waste plant, in Sangrur’s rice straw facility, in the 130-plus plants across Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, and Haryana that quietly sold 42,800 tonnes of domestically produced gas to city networks in FY2024-25 while the country was importing 23 million tonnes through Hormuz [11, 12].
The scale gap between 130 plants and 5,000 is an infrastructure investment gap. Every CBG plant commissioned today is a permanent structural reduction in India’s Hormuz exposure — one that cannot be reversed by geopolitics, does not require emergency cabinet meetings, and generates commercial returns for its investors. Every kilogram of bio-LPG produced from Indian agricultural waste is a kilogram that did not travel through a blockaded strait on a tanker whose insurance has been withdrawn.
India has the feedstock — 87 billion cubic metres of annual CBG potential. It has the technology — proven at commercial scale. It has the policy — SATAT, CBO, MNRE CFA, DPI, BAM, GOBARdhan. It has the demand — 33 crore LPG consumers and a gas grid that needs to grow from 6.5% to 15% of the energy mix. What it needs is the investment in plants, the feedstock supply chains, and the technology partners who can translate that potential into operational facilities before the next emergency order is issued.
About Advance Biofuel
Advance Biofuel is a leading CBG plant manufacturer and biofuel solutions provider in India. We deliver end-to-end turnkey solutions for compressed biogas plants, 2G ethanol bio-refineries, and multi-feedstock biomass biofuel facilities — from DPR and feasibility assessment through plant engineering, regulatory clearances, commissioning, and OMC offtake tie-ups.
If you are evaluating a CBG plant, a bio-LPG recovery system, or a multi-feedstock biogas facility — India’s cooking gas emergency is your business case. Contact us at advancebiofuel.in.
References & Citations
All statistics and facts are sourced from verifiable publications. Links current as of March 2026.
[1] Sunday Guardian Live / AngelOne, March 9-10, 2026 — ESMA invoked March 5 (ECA 1955); 33 crore LPG connections; 31.3 MMT consumed FY2024-25; 12.8 MMT domestic; 85-90% imports via Hormuz; Delhi cylinder ₹913 (+₹60). https://sundayguardianlive.com/india/why-is-india-rationing-lpg-cylinders-nation-boosts-production-for-households-rations-commercial-cylinders-amid-gulf-energy-crisis-all-you-need-to-know-175199/
[2] The Week / AHAR, March 10, 2026 — 20% Mumbai hotels shut (8,000 establishments affected — AHAR); commercial LPG +₹302.50 in 2026; Chennai hotel association: zero stock; commercial cylinder shortage in Bengaluru, Mumbai, Chennai. https://www.theweek.in/news/biz-tech/2026/03/10/lpg-shortage-disrupts-restaurants-hotels.html
[3] RealShePower / Household First analysis, March 10, 2026 — Morbi ceramics (world 2nd-largest cluster): production halved; penalty rates 2x for excess quota; Surat textile/food processing: export delays, single-shift operations; Vatva chemical estate: 250 units affected. https://www.realshepower.in/india-rations-industrial-gas-amid-gulf-crisis/
[4] National Herald India, March 2026 — LPG strategic reserve ~10 days; Kolkata black market ₹1,500/cylinder; Delhi NCR ₹3,000/cylinder; Punjab rationing amid budget pressure; India dependency 67% Gulf via Hormuz. https://www.nationalheraldindia.com/national/massive-lpg-shortage-grips-india-amid-iran-war-disruptions
[5] AngelOne / India TV News, March 2026 — Emergency US Gulf Coast contract: 2.2 MMT (~10% of import needs); 332 million active LPG consumers; non-Hormuz imports raised from 55% to 70% as emergency measure. https://www.angelone.in/news/economy/india-invokes-esma-powers-directs-refiners-to-increase-lpg-production-amid-supply-risks
[6] Drewry Maritime Research, 2025 — India LPG import dependency: 47% in 2015 → 67% in 2024; Middle East >97% of India’s LPG imports 2024. https://www.drewry.co.uk/maritime-research-opinion-browser/maritime-research-opinions/growth-in-indias-2025-lpg-imports-to-be-a-few-shades-lower-than-surge-in-2024
[7] Business Standard / Kpler, March 10, 2026 — India LPG imports 2025: 23.3 MMT (+8.4% from 2024); IEA projects demand to reach 37.7 MMT by 2030 at 2.5% annual CAGR. https://www.business-standard.com/india-news/india-lpg-imports-alternate-routes-hormuz-disruption-shipping-time-us-gulf-126031000733_1.html
[8] Global Methane Initiative / TERI / EPA — India CBG Plant Study, January 2025 — India LNG imports FY2023-24: 66.7 BCM ($13.3 bn); 11 CBG plants studied in 5 states — 4 non-operational, primary cause: feedstock supply management; SATAT targets 5,000 plants by 2030. https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/CBG_Report_%20January%202025.pdf
[9] PMF IAS / ScienceDirect — CBG Sector Analysis, 2025 — CBG energy content 47-52 MJ/kg vs CNG 50-56 MJ/kg; natural gas at 6.5% of energy mix, target 15% by 2030; 0.5 tonne CO₂ produced per tonne CBG; FOM nitrogen-potassium limitations. https://www.pmfias.com/compressed-biogas-sector/
[10] IEA — India Gas Market Report, 2025 — India CBG potential: ~87 BCM/year; current output <1% of potential; CBG output could reach 0.8 BCM by 2030; 508 plants under development as of September 2024. https://www.iea.org/reports/india-gas-market-report/executive-summary
[11] PIB — MoPNG Year End Review 2025, December 2025 — Over 130 CBG plants commissioned by November 2025; CBO commenced FY2025-26; gas pipelines 25,429 km; 307 CGD geographical areas; 8,400 CNG stations; 1.57 crore PNG connections. https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2208694
[12] REGlobal — India’s CBG Sector Gains Momentum, July 2025 — 108 plants commissioned (July 2025); CBG sales FY2024-25: 42,800 tonnes (>50% of all-time 79,200 t); price revised to 85% CNG RSP from May 2025; CBG in 64 geographic areas, 350 retail outlets. https://reglobal.org/indian-cbg-sector-gains-momentum-but-challenges-remain/
[13] MarkNtel Advisors / Prayagraj CBG Plant, November 2025 — HPCL committed USD 231 million for 24 CBG plants; Prayagraj Arail plant: 100 TPD municipal waste → CBG, inaugurated November 2025; 1,100+ LOIs supporting project pipeline. https://www.marknteladvisors.com/research-library/compressed-biogas-cbg-market-india.html
[14] Fairfield Market Research — Global Bio-LPG Market, 2025 — Bio-LPG market: USD 2.15 billion (2025) → USD 4.4 billion (2030) at 15.44% CAGR; India and Indonesia targeted as high-priority deployment markets for household LPG decarbonisation. https://www.fairfieldmarketresearch.com/report/bio-lpg-market
[15] SATAT Portal / Advancebiofuel.in — FOM MDA: ₹1,500/MT from Ministry of Agriculture; MNRE CFA up to ₹4 crore per 4,800 kg/day CBG; DPI Scheme: ₹994.50 crore FY2024-26; BAM Scheme: ₹564.75 crore FY2023-27; RBI PSL: up to ₹50 crore. https://advancebiofuel.in/cbg-blending-mandate-2026-start-cbg-plant/
